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ABSTRACT 
  In investor-state arbitration, tribunals can and should apply the 
English rule on legal costs and abandon the two alternatives, the 
American rule and the pro-claimant rule. Under the English rule, the 
unsuccessful party in a dispute must indemnify the prevailing party 
for the costs of dispute resolution. Both doctrine and public policy 
support the application of the English rule, particularly in light of the 
much-publicized backlash against the investor-state arbitration 
system. Most importantly, the English rule would help to mitigate the 
two most commonly identified causes of the backlash—the system’s 
alleged proinvestor bias and its chilling effect on host states’ legitimate 
use of police power. Though a slowly growing number of tribunals 
have either followed or purported to follow the English rule, the 
doctrine and policies that justify applying it have so far been either 
poorly articulated or ignored. This Note presents those justifications 
in detail for the first time. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Note addresses the treatment of legal costs in investor-state 
arbitration. Amid the chaos of praise,1 scorn,2 and proposals for 
redesigning the investor-state arbitration system’s most fundamental 
mechanics,3 the question of how lawyers and arbitrators are paid may 
seem peripheral. But the treatment of legal costs plays an important 
role in the investor-state arbitration system. Certainly, the sums of 
money paid out in legal cost awards are vast.4 More importantly, as 
Judge Richard Posner and many other writers have observed, the 
allocation of legal costs in any dispute-settlement system influences 
the character of that system, including the types of claims brought, the 
claimants who bring them, and the manner in which they are 
resolved.5 If the investor-state arbitration system needs reworking or 
 
 1. See generally Stephen M. Schwebel, Judge, The Overwhelming Merits of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, Remarks at Suffolk University Law School (Oct. 31, 2008), in 32 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 263 (2009) (praising the benefits of investor-state arbitration for both 
capital-exporting and capital-importing countries). 
 2. See generally THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS 
AND REALITY (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010) (cataloguing the criticisms of investor-state 
arbitration, including institutional biases, the “legitimacy deficit,” and inconsistent 
jurisprudence); M. Sornarajah, The Retreat of Neo-Liberalism in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 
in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 273 (Catherine A. Rogers & Roger P. Alford 
eds., 2009) (arguing that overreaching by “neo-liberals” has led to dissatisfaction with investor-
state arbitration and the slowing down of treatymaking). 
 3. See generally GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC 
LAW (2007) (arguing that only the security of tenure can adequately ensure that judges properly 
apply international investment law and proposing the creation of an international investment 
court); Patrick Juillard, The Law of International Investment: Can the Imbalance Be Redressed?, 
in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY: 2008-2009, at 273 (Karl P. 
Sauvant ed., 2009) (proposing that the “entire development of international investment law 
should at some point come under reappraisal”); Todd Weiler, Balancing Human Rights and 
Investor Protection, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 429 (2004) (proposing a “counterclaim 
mechanism” under which nationals of host countries could bring claims under investment 
treaties against foreign investors for violations of traditional human rights). 
 4. See, e.g., EDF (Servs.) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award, ¶ 329 
(Oct. 8, 2009), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=showDoc&docId=DC1215_En&caseId=C57 (ordering the claimant to pay $6 million of 
Romania’s legal costs); PSEG Global Inc. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/05, 
Award, ¶ 353 (Jan. 19, 2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC630_En&caseId=C212 (ordering Turkey to pay 
almost $14 million in legal costs); Československá Obchodní Banka A.S. v. Slovak Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Award, ¶ 374 (Dec. 29, 2004), 13 ICSID Rep. 181 (2008) (ordering 
the Slovak Republic to pay $10 million of the claimant’s legal costs). 
 5. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 70–73 
(1996); Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Predictability of Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 427, 444–
45 (1995); J. Robert S. Prichard, A Systemic Approach to Comparative Law: The Effect of Cost, 
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fine-tuning, its rule on legal costs is a promising instrument of reform. 
Indeed, among the growing literature on redesigning the investor-
state arbitration system, there have already been two prominent 
proposals directed at rethinking the system’s treatment of legal costs.6 
Dean John Gotanda has proposed a more careful and consistent 
application of the American rule,7 whereas Professor Stephan Schill 
has argued that a pro-claimant rule would be more appropriate.8 As 
does this Note, both of those proposals draw extensively from the 
numerous studies9 of legal costs written in the United States in 
response to the late twentieth-century “litigation boom.”10 
Unlike Gotanda and Schill, however, this Note argues for the 
application of the English rule. Under the English rule, the 
unsuccessful party in a dispute must indemnify the prevailing party 
for its legal costs. Though investor-state tribunals seem to apply 
either the American rule or a de facto version of the pro-claimant 
rule in the majority of cases, tribunals have unambiguously followed 
the English rule in several decisions and have at least appeared to do 
 
Fee, and Financing Rules on the Development of the Substantive Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 451, 
463–64 (1988). 
 6. Stephan W. Schill, Arbitration Risk and Effective Compliance: Cost-Shifting in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 7 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 653 (2006); John Y. 
Gotanda, Attorneys’ Fees Agonistes: The Implications of Inconsistency in the Awarding of Fees 
and Costs in International Arbitrations 2 (Villanova Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2010-01, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1491755. 
 7. Gotanda, supra note 6, at 17–19. Under the American rule, both parties pay their own 
legal costs regardless of which party prevails on the merits. See infra Part II.A. 
 8. Schill, supra note 6, at 690. Under the pro-claimant rule, the respondent pays its own 
legal costs regardless of which party prevails on the merits. A claimant may recover its legal 
costs, however, if it prevails on the merits. See infra Part II.B. 
 9. Both Schill, supra note 6, and Gotanda, supra note 6, draw extensively from the studies 
of legal costs produced in the United States in response to the late twentieth-century “litigation 
boom.” The way in which the increased frequency of American litigation and the increased 
frequency of investor-state arbitration are invariably described in the academic literature—as a 
“litigation boom” and an “explosion of claims”—suggests a parallel between the two 
phenomena. Reference to the 1998 “explosion of claims” in investor-state arbitration is very 
frequent. See, e.g., M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 309 
(2010) (“[W]ith the explosion of claims against states, states began to explore fresh avenues of 
defending the claims.”); Nigel Blackaby & Lluís Paradell, Investment Treaty Arbitration, in 1 
BERNSTEIN’S HANDBOOK OF ARBITRATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE 10-001,  
-006 (John Tackaberry & Arthur Marriott eds., 4th ed. 2003) (“[T]he explosion of [investor-
state] arbitration is a recent phenomenon.”); Jonathan C. Hamilton, A Decade of Latin 
American Investment Arbitration, in LATIN AMERICAN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: 
THE CONTROVERSIES AND CONFLICTS 69, 71 (Mary H. Moura & Thomas E. Carbonneau eds., 
2008) (referring to “an explosion in Latin American investment arbitration”). 
 10. Paul Reidinger, The Litigation Boom, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1, 1987, at 37. 
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so in many more.11 Unfortunately, these tribunals have failed to 
articulate adequately their reasons for applying the English rule. This 
lack of explanation is curious given the strong doctrinal and public 
policy justifications for the English rule’s application, particularly in 
light of the backlash that currently threatens the investor-state 
arbitration system—a backlash manifested in the form of states’ 
withdrawals from investment treaties, refusals to honor awards, and 
the reemergence of the “toothless” investment treaty.12 
Indeed, application of the English rule would help investor-state 
tribunals mitigate the two most commonly cited causes of this 
troubling backlash: the system’s alleged proinvestor bias and its 
chilling effect on host states’ legitimate use of police power.13 Much 
like the tribunals themselves, the academic literature has so far failed 
to identify this connection. This Note clarifies both the doctrinal and 
public policy justifications for the English rule’s application. Parts I 
and II provide the necessary background. Part I describes the 
mechanics of investor-state arbitration and details the system’s short 
history, including the explosion of claims since 1998, the much-
publicized backlash since 2007, and the allegations of bias and 
regulatory chill. Part II then describes the inconsistent and 
unpredictable treatment of legal costs in investor-state arbitration. 
Thereafter, Parts III and IV explain the arguments in favor of the 
English rule. Part III addresses doctrine. When advocating for the 
application of the American rule or the pro-claimant rule, writers and 
tribunals primarily emphasize case law14—although both concede that 
this approach is inadequate. Because the investor-state arbitration 
system lacks a formal rule of stare decisis, case law is not binding 
upon tribunals in subsequent cases.15 Therefore, Part III looks beyond 
case law and addresses all of the sources of substantive and 
procedural law applicable in the investor-state arbitration system: the 
 
 11. See infra Part II.C. 
 12. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 13. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 14. This is consistent with legal reasoning in investor-state arbitration generally. See Ole 
Kristian Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals: An Empirical Analysis, 19 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 301, 356–59 (2008) (reviewing almost one hundred investor-state arbitral awards and 
demonstrating empirically that investor-state tribunals rely on “precedent” in roughly 90 
percent of decisions, more than any other means of determining the law). 
 15. August Reinisch, The Role of Precedent in ICSID Arbitration, 2008 AUSTRIAN ARB. 
Y.B. 495, 501. 
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host state’s domestic law,16 “general principles of law as recognized by 
civilized nations,”17 and the texts of investment treaties and other ex 
ante agreements.18 Though these sources do not necessarily require 
tribunals to apply the English rule, they provide substantial support 
for its application. 
Finally, Part IV presents public policy justifications for applying 
the English rule. Considerations of public policy frequently play a 
role in the decisionmaking of investor-state tribunals.19 Academic 
commentaries—including proposals encouraging tribunals to apply 
the American rule or the pro-claimant rule—often have the same 
emphasis.20 After reexamining the financial incentives that these two 
rules create, however, this Note demonstrates that both the American 
rule and the pro-claimant rule exacerbate the most commonly 
identified causes of the backlash against investor-state arbitration. 
Therefore, because the continued application of the American rule or 
the pro-claimant rule would be harmful to the ongoing viability of 
investor-state arbitration, tribunals should use their discretion to 
apply the English rule. 
I.  THE INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION SYSTEM: BACKGROUND 
AND BACKLASH 
The investor-state arbitration system is a network of 
approximately three thousand bilateral and multilateral investment 
treaties that first emerged in 1957 and proliferated rapidly from 1980 
to 2001.21 To Americans, the most famous of these investment treaties 
is probably the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA)22—though NAFTA is better known in the context of the 
free trade debate. In addition to creating a broad framework for 
 
 16. See infra Part III.B. 
 17. See infra Part III.C. 
 18. See infra Part III.A. 
 19. See Fauchald, supra note 14, at 356 (demonstrating empirically that investor-state 
tribunals rely on public policy or “reasonable results” in just under 40 percent of decisions). 
 20. See, e.g., Schill, supra note 6, at 690–91 (arguing that the pro-claimant rule would 
incentivize compliance with international investment law); Gotanda, supra note 6, at 17–18 
(arguing that the consistent application of the American rule would improve predictability). 
 21. United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., World Investment Report 2006: FDI from 
Developing and Transition Economies: Implications for Development, 28 fig.I.14, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/WIR/2006 (2006). 
 22. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 
(1993). 
RIESENBERG IN PRINTER PROOF 12/5/2010  11:12:12 PM 
982 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:977 
multilateral trade liberalization, Chapter 11 of NAFTA includes the 
two standard obligations of any ordinary investment treaty.23 The first 
of these is substantive, whereas the second is procedural. By acceding 
to a multilateral or bilateral investment treaty, the signatory states 
undertake, first, to provide foreign investors with substantive rights 
and protections24 and, second, to give ex ante consent to binding 
arbitration of any disputes based on the state’s future violations of 
investors’ rights and protections.25 
A.  The Structure and Mechanics of Investor-State Arbitration 
1. Substantive Rights and Protections.  Most investment treaties 
contain a standard set of substantive protections for foreign investors, 
including protection from expropriation, protection from 
discriminatory treatment, and a guarantee of fair and equitable 
treatment.26 American writers have frequently compared these treaty 
protections to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ restraints on 
government action: protection from expropriation resembles the 
Takings Clause,27 protection from discriminatory treatment resembles 
the Equal Protection Clause,28 and guarantees of fair and equitable 
treatment resemble elements of the Due Process Clause.29 These 
 
 23. See Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment 
Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 366 (2003) (“In 1994 the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force, bringing with it an adjudicatory 
regime that gives investors the right to require arbitration of disputes arising out of investments 
in another member country in connection with matters such as expropriation, discrimination, 
and unfair treatment.” (footnote omitted)). 
 24. Schwebel, supra note 1, at 263. 
 25. Id. at 267. 
 26. See, e.g., David Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the New Constitutionalism, 25 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 757, 767 (2000) (describing the “regime of investment rules” at the heart 
of the new “constitutional” order). 
 27. See, e.g., Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s 
Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” 
Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 59–86 (2003) (examining the relationship between the NAFTA 
tribunals’ decisions on expropriation claims and U.S. domestic law on “regulatory takings”); 
Edward J. Sullivan & Kelly D. Connor, Making the Continent Safe for Investors—NAFTA and 
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution, 36 URB. LAW. 99, 100–
02 (2004) (same). 
 28. See, e.g., Vicki Been, NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the Division of Authority for 
Land Use and Environmental Controls, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 19, 23 (2002) (comparing 
“investor protections” to “the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection and Privileges and 
Immunities Clauses”). 
 29. The fair and equitable treatment standard includes a guarantee to provide investors 
with due process of law in administrative and judicial proceedings. A second major component 
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treaty benefits, however, are not made available to everyone—only to 
foreign investors from other treaty states and only in disputes arising 
from foreign investment. Neither the host state’s nationals nor the 
average foreign tourists receive similar assurances.30 
2. Binding Dispute Resolution.  By acceding to an investment 
treaty, a state gives ex ante consent to binding arbitration of any 
investor’s claim that arises from the state’s breach of the treaty’s 
substantive protections. Investors bring their claims against host state 
governments before tribunals of neutral arbitrators, selected either by 
an appointing authority such as the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or ad hoc by the parties 
themselves.31 Unlike most litigation under international law, private 
investors can initiate investor-state arbitration without the need for 
any legal or diplomatic action by their home states’ governments.32 
For example, in PSEG Global Inc. v. Republic of Turkey,33 an 
American power plant developer brought its claim directly against 
the Turkish government for negligently failing to disclose key 
information during the implementation of a power plant project.34 
The U.S. government did not intervene or have any role in the 
dispute. The parties—the power plant developer and the Turkish 
government—jointly appointed a tribunal of three arbitrators 
pursuant to the ICSID arbitration provisions of a bilateral investment 
treaty between the United States and Turkey.35 The tribunal 
ultimately found that Turkey’s failure to disclose certain key 
information constituted a breach of the fair-and-equitable-treatment 
 
of the standard, unrelated to due process of law, includes the protection of investors’ legitimate 
expectations at the time the investment was made, whether created by contractual 
arrangements, legislative commitments, or specific assurances. For a summary and analysis of 
the jurisprudence in this area, see Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard 
in Investment Treaties, 39 INT’L LAW. 87, 94–106 (2005). 
 30. See generally Julian Davis Mortenson, The Meaning of “Investment”: ICSID’s Travaux 
and the Domain of International Investment Law, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 257 (2010) (describing the 
traditionally narrow scope of the terms “investor” and “investment” as applied in international 
investment law and presenting arguments for broadening those definitions). 
 31. Schwebel, supra note 1, at 267. 
 32. Id. 
 33. PSEG Global Inc. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/05, Award (Jan. 19, 
2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=show
Doc&docId=DC630_En&caseId=C212. 
 34. Id. ¶¶ 246–256. 
 35. Id. ¶ 2. 
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standard of this investment treaty,36 and it awarded compensation to 
the power plant developer.37 Similarly, in Československá Obchodní 
Banka A.S. v. Slovak Republic,38 a Czech commercial bank won a 
claim directly against the Slovak government for its failure to repay a 
loan.39 There, too, the Czech government had no role in the 
proceeding, which remained the claimant’s to pursue from initiation 
to conclusion.  
After arbitration has concluded, a successful claimant may 
enforce the tribunal’s award against the host states’ assets under one 
of two multilateral treaties—the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention)40 
or the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Between States and Nationals of Other States (Washington 
Convention)41—in the domestic courts of any nation that is party to 
those conventions.42 Enforcement of these arbitration awards is 
considered “automatic”43 because courts may only set aside these 
awards on very narrow grounds such as fraud, corruption, or ultra 
vires action on the part of the arbitrator.44 
 
 36. Id. ¶¶ 246–256. 
 37. Id. at 90.  
 38. Československá Obchodní Banka A.S. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, 
Award (Dec. 29, 2004), 13 ICSID Rep. 181 (2008). 
 39. Id. ¶ 223. 
 40. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
 41. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter 
Washington Convention]. 
 42. Under the Washington Convention, a state binds its domestic courts to enforce awards 
rendered by ICSID-appointed tribunals against respondent states’ assets within its jurisdiction. 
Similarly, under the New York Convention, a state binds its domestic courts to enforce non-
ICSID treaty awards rendered by ad hoc tribunals. The conventions are ratified by over 150 
states each. See CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN, DON WALLACE, JR., NOAH RUBINS & BORZU 
SABAHI, INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 675–700 (2008) (describing the investment law 
enforcement mechanism). 
 43. Christoph Schreuer, The World Bank/ICSID Dispute Settlement Procedures, in 
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN TAX TREATY LAW 579, 581 (Michael Lang & Mario Züger eds., 
2002) (“The [Washington] Convention offers a system of automatic enforcement that is not 
subject to any review of the award at the stage of enforcement.”). 
 44. Shelby R. Grubbs & Esther R. DeCambra, United States, in INTERNATIONAL CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 781, 801 (Shelby R. Grubbs ed., 2003). 
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B.  Historical Background of Investor-State Arbitration 
1. 1998 to 2007: Overwhelming Praise.  Although these two 
complementary obligations unavoidably restrict states’ freedom of 
action in dealing with foreign investors, states were for several 
decades quite willing to undertake these obligations by ratifying 
investment treaties. During the 1990s, as the number of effective 
investment treaties grew into the thousands,45 international law 
scholars reacted euphorically. They called the investor-state 
arbitration system “a revolution,”46 a “transformation,”47 and a “sea 
change.”48 Its merits were “overwhelming”49 and its success was 
“unmitigated.”50 After twentieth-century experiences with the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the emergence of this new and 
effective international legal process was a significant change. Since its 
founding seventy years ago, the ICJ has decided fewer than 150 
cases51 and has awarded monetary damages only once52—in its very 
first case.53 That award was paid in full, but not until fifty-seven years 
 
 45. United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., supra note 21, at 26–29. 
 46. Joel C. Beauvais, Student Article, Regulatory Expropriations Under NAFTA: Emerging 
Principles & Lingering Doubts, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 245, 253 (2002) (describing the 
conventional wisdom that “[t]he [bilateral investment treaty] revolution has been accompanied 
by . . . an explosion in capital imports to developing countries”). 
 47. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Treatification of International Investment Law, 13 LAW & 
BUS. REV. AM. 155, 163 (2007) (“The nature and sources of international investment law have 
undergone a significant transformation in a relatively short time.”). 
 48. Ian A. Laird, A Community of Destiny—The Barcelona Traction Case and the 
Development of Shareholder Rights to Bring Investment Claims, in INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, 
BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 77, 94 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005) 
(observing that, “[w]ith respect to international investment instruments, there is no doubt that 
there has been a sea change away” from previous international law). 
 49. Schwebel, supra note 1, at 263 (“The merits of bilateral investment treaties are 
substantial, indeed, overwhelming.”). 
 50. Thomas W. Wälde, Improving the Mechanisms for Treaty Negotiation and Investment 
Disputes: Competition and Choice as the Path to Quality and Legitimacy, in YEARBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY, supra note 3, at 505, 506 (calling “the 
unexpected, rapid, and extensive development of investment arbitration over the past fifteen 
years” an “unmitigated success”). 
 51. See Advisory Proceedings, INT’L CT. OF JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?
p1=3&p2=4 (last visited Nov. 24, 2010) (listing twenty-six advisory opinions issued since 1947); 
Contentious Cases, INT’L CT. OF JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3 (last 
visited Nov. 24, 2010) (listing 122 contentious cases decided since 1947). 
 52. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 244, 250 (Dec. 15) (awarding damages to 
the United Kingdom for damage done to one of its vessels from a minefield in Albanian 
waters). 
 53. CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 198 (2007). 
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after the ruling.54 The ICJ has not awarded damages since. By 
contrast, in investor-state arbitration, claims are heard, damages are 
awarded, and awards are enforced. Since 1998 investor-state tribunals 
have decided more than 150 cases,55  awarding damages in nearly half 
of them.56 These awards are paid in full in an estimated 90 percent of 
cases.57 At the time of writing, more than 100 new disputes were 
pending.58 
2. From 2007 to the Present: Signs of Backlash.  Since 2007, 
however, the system has suffered a crisis of confidence, suggesting 
that states’ interests are not being adequately protected under 
international investment law. A small but growing number of national 
governments have begun to reject and denounce investor-state 
arbitration, “voting with their feet and leaving the system.”59 For 
example, Bolivia withdrew from the Washington Convention.60 
Ecuador terminated nine of its investment treaties.61 The Russian 
Federation withdrew from the multilateral Energy Charter Treaty.62 
 
 54. Laurence W. Maher, Half Light Between War and Peace: Herbert Vere Evatt, the Rule 
of International Law, and the Corfu Channel Case, 9 AUSTRALIAN J. LEGAL HIST. 47, 80 (2005). 
 55. List of Concluded Cases, INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, http://
icsid.worldbank.org (follow “Cases” hyperlink; then follow “List of Cases” hyperlink; then 
follow “Concluded Cases” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 24, 2010) (listing 171 cases decided since 
1998). 
 56. See Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 49 (2007) (surveying fifty-two investor-state arbitral awards and 
finding that investors had won compensation in 38.5 percent of them). 
 57. DUGAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 675 n.1. 
 58. List of Pending Cases, INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, http://
icsid.worldbank.org (follow “Cases” hyperlink; then follow “List of Cases” hyperlink; then 
follow “Pending Cases” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 24, 2010). This figure does not include non-
ICSID treaty claims pending before non-ICSID tribunals. 
 59. Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa Liz Chung & Claire Balchin, The Backlash 
Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION, supra note 2, at xxxvii, xlii. 
 60. Press Release, Int’l Centre for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Bolivia Submits a Notice 
Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention (May 16, 2007), available at http://icsid.worldbank
.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=Announc
ementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement3 (announcing Bolivia’s 
official withdrawal from the Washington Convention). 
 61. Luke Eric Peterson, Ecuador Will Denounce at Least Nine Bilateral Investment Treaties, 
INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Feb. 5, 2008), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/itn_feb5_2008.pdf 
(describing Ecuador’s withdrawal from at least nine investment treaties “[a]midst growing 
discontent amongst South American Governments with the system of international investment 
protection”). 
 62. Francesca Albert & Robert Rothkopf, Russia Rejects Energy Charter Treaty: A New 
Era for Investment Arbitration?, INT’L L. OFFICE (Oct. 22, 2009), http://www.internationallaw
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Argentina refuses to honor certain categories of arbitral awards.63 
Moreover, the conclusion of new investment treaties has slowed to a 
crawl.64 Even among developed economies such as the United States, 
Australia, and Japan, toothless treaties containing the standard 
substantive protections but lacking ex ante consent to arbitration 
have resurfaced.65 
This apparent backlash against international investment law has 
become the subject of tremendous attention and debate. Writers 
attempting to identify the causes of the backlash frequently point to 
two defects in the investor-state arbitration system: first, the system is 
allegedly afflicted by a proinvestor bias;66 second, the system causes 
“regulatory chill.”67 Neither of these criticisms has been simple to 
prove or disprove, but both have been pervasive. 
The proinvestor bias theory of investor-state arbitration arises 
from several different underlying concerns. First, some scholars have 
criticized the treaty-negotiation process as “lopsided” because 
 
office.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=17675c7c-c55e-4f1d-81cd-e5610fd3b3d8 (noting “Russia’s 
reluctance to provide investment protections on its own territory”). 
 63. See, e.g., Luke Eric Peterson, Argentine Crisis Arbitration Awards Pile Up, but Investors 
Still Wait for a Payout, LAW.COM (June 25, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international/
LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202431736731 (describing Argentina’s failure to pay awards arising from 
the emergency measures it took in response to the 2002 financial crisis). 
 64. See Anne van Aaken, Perils of Success? The Case of International Investment 
Protection, 9 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008) (observing that the rate of new investment 
treaties concluded has dropped off since the explosion of investor-state claims). 
 65. See, e.g., Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of the Philippines for an 
Economic Partnership, Japan-Phil., art. 107, Sept. 9, 2006, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/
region/asia-paci/philippine/epa0609/main.pdf (permitting, but not compelling, signatory states to 
consent to arbitration with investors); Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-
Austl., art. 11.16, May 18, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/australian-fta/final-text (same). 
 66. See generally Gus Van Harten, Perceived Bias in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in THE 
BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION, supra note 2, at 433 (finding that a key 
problem is not that persons involved in investment treaty arbitration are biased, but that issues 
of structure cast doubt on the system). 
 67. See, e.g., SARAH ANDERSON & SARA GRUSKY, CHALLENGING CORPORATE 
INVESTOR RULE: HOW THE WORLD BANK’S INVESTMENT COURT, FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS, AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES HAVE UNLEASHED A NEW ERA OF 
CORPORATE POWER AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 4 (2007), available at http://www.ips-
dc.org/reports/challenging_corporate_investor_rule (“[T]he threat of massive damages awards 
can put a ‘chilling effect’ on responsible policy-making.”); AARON COSBEY, HOWARD MANN, 
LUKE ERIC PETERSON & KONRAD VON MOLTKE, INVESTMENT AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT: A GUIDE TO THE USE AND POTENTIAL OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
AGREEMENTS 20 (2004) (“A secondary concern is that regulators who are held liable for their 
impacts on investors will not regulate to the extent that they should (the regulatory chill 
argument).”). 
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“[d]eveloping countries are pressured to give up their interests and 
concerns in exchange for greater incentives to investors.”68 Second, 
commentators have criticized the substantive treaty rights themselves 
as “vague” and “open-ended,” and therefore subject to being 
construed in ways that the host states could not possibly have 
expected at the time they entered into the treaties.69 Third, and most 
troublingly, the president of Bolivia and others have accused the 
dispute-settlement process itself of being biased in favor of investors, 
alleging that “[g]overnments in Latin America . . . never win the 
cases” and that the investors “always win.”70 Empirical studies suggest 
that this last accusation is unfounded,71 but the overall perception has, 
nonetheless, been difficult to shed.72 
Similarly, the regulatory chill theory is also difficult to prove or 
disprove. According to some commentators, the threat of an 
investment dispute has rendered traditional governmental protection 
of health, safety, and human rights prohibitively expensive. One 
writer has argued that investor-state arbitration “has gone from being 
a protective shield for defending investors against unfair and 
discriminatory treatment to a sword used by those investors to attack 
legitimate government regulation pursued in the public interest.”73 
Another reports that “practicing lawyers do admit that they hear 
rumours of investors applying informal pressure upon host states—
while brandishing an investment treaty as a potential legal stick.”74 
 
 68. Olivia Chung, Note, The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime and Its Effect 
on the Future of Investor-State Arbitration, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 953, 958 (2007). 
 69. Id. at 960. 
 70. Leslie Mazoch, Chavez Takes Cool View Towards OAS, Says Latin America Better Off 
Without World Bank, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 30, 2007, 11:09 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/huff-wires/20070430/la-gen-venezuela-leftist-alternative/ (quoting Evo Morales, President, 
Bolivia). 
 71. See Franck, supra note 56, at 50 (surveying fifty-two awards and concluding that “[t]he 
percentage of ultimate winners does not appear to be meaningfully different for investors and 
governments.”). 
 72. See, e.g., Van Harten, supra note 66, at 433 (“Investment treaty arbitration is 
characterized by an apparent bias in favor of claimants and against respondent states.”). 
 73. Aaron Cosbey, The Road to Hell? Investor Protections in NAFTA’s Chapter 11, in 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: BALANCING RIGHTS AND 
REWARDS 150, 151 (Lyuba Zarsky ed., 2005). 
 74. Luke Eric Peterson, All Roads Lead Out of Rome: Divergent Paths of Dispute 
Settlement in Bilateral Investment Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 73, at 123, 139. 
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Though little empirical evidence exists to confirm the regulatory chill 
theory, it is nonetheless a favorite of the system’s critics.75 
Informed by these criticisms, an extensive literature has emerged 
over the last few years addressing how the much-beloved and much-
maligned system can be fixed.76 Many proposals, such as a global 
investment court of appeals with a tenured judiciary,77 seem too 
ambitious to be politically feasible at present. Multilateral trade 
treaties and the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute-
settlement mechanism may provide some hope for the establishment 
of global, “top-down” solutions in the future, but attempts at drafting 
multilateral treaties have experienced a gloomy “eight decades of 
failure” in the investment law context.78 For now, it appears that 
effective changes to international investment law can only be brought 
about in a piecemeal, case-by-case fashion by the tribunals 
themselves. 
II.  THE CURRENT TREATMENT OF LEGAL COSTS 
As Part I explains, the two most commonly identified causes of 
the backlash against investor-state arbitration are the system’s alleged 
proinvestor bias and its chilling effect on host states’ legitimate use of 
police power. As Part IV ultimately shows, the English rule on legal 
costs can help to mitigate both of these factors. But before this can be 
explained, it is necessary to examine and understand the system’s 
inconsistent treatment of legal costs. 
Whether domestic or international, dispute settlement systems 
allocate “legal costs”—court costs, attorneys’ fees, experts’ fees, and 
arbitrators’ fees—according to three distinct practices: the American 
rule, the English rule, and the pro-claimant rule. Under the American 
rule, “the costs lie where they fall.”79 That is, both the respondent and 
claimant pay their own legal costs, regardless of which party is 
 
 75. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 76. See, e.g., Juillard, supra note 3, at 168 (proposing that the “entire development of 
international law should at some point come under reappraisal”). 
 77. Michael D. Goldhaber, Wanted: A World Investment Court, AM. LAW., Summer 2004, 
at 26. 
 78. See Charles H. Brower, II, Reflections on the Road Ahead: Living with Decentralization 
in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION, supra note 2, 
at 339, 348 (calling “simple, top-down solutions” unfeasible and drawing on “eight decades of 
failure to negotiate comprehensive multilateral treaties on foreign investment” as proof). 
 79. Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 10 
(1984). 
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successful on the merits.80 There is no shifting of legal costs,81 except 
when one of the two parties is penalized for litigating in bad faith.82 
By contrast, under the English rule, “the costs follow the event.”83 
That is, the party that is unsuccessful on the merits must always 
indemnify the prevailing party for part or all of its legal costs, even 
when both sides litigate in good faith.84 Finally, under the hybridized 
pro-claimant rule, prevailing claimants always recover their legal 
costs, as under the English rule, but prevailing respondents must 
always bear their own legal costs, as under the American rule.85 
In domestic litigation, the prospect of having to pay one’s own 
legal costs or an opponent’s legal costs can have a material effect on 
the decision to pursue, contest, or settle a claim. In investor-state 
arbitration, the sheer expense of the system likely amplifies this 
effect. On average, respondents incur annual legal costs ranging from 
one to two million dollars for a single dispute,86 though costs can far 
exceed this average. In one case, the claimant and the respondent 
 
 80. See, e.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717–18 
(1967) (discussing the American rule and the policies underpinning it); Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 
U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (recognizing the American rule to be “[t]he general practice of the 
United States”). 
 81. The common law exceptions to this general rule, such as the common benefit doctrine, 
are applied very rarely. For the U.S. Supreme Court’s description of the common benefit 
doctrine, see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 245–46 (1975). 
 82. Id. The practice of awarding costs to punish bad-faith litigation has also been 
incorporated into Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 
(permitting U.S. federal courts to sanction litigants for pleadings, motions, or other papers that 
are “presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or 
needlessly increase the cost of litigation,” or that are based on frivolous facts or legal theories). 
 83. MICHAEL ZANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 573 
(10th ed. 2007). 
 84. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, DAVID S. CLARK & JOHN O. HALEY, THE CIVIL LAW 
TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA 1026–27 (1994). 
 85. This is not the generally applicable rule in any domestic jurisdiction, but several 
jurisdictions—including the United States—apply it in certain exceptional cases. See Harold J. 
Krent, Explaining One-Way Fee Shifting, 79 VA. L. REV. 2039, 2041 (1993). 
 86. See Secretariat, United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., Issues Related to 
International Arrangements: Investor-State Disputes and Policy Implications, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. 
TD/B/COM.2/62 (Jan. 14, 2005) (noting that the expected legal fees incurred by the Czech 
Republic for one case were over $13.8 million in one year). 
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each reported incurring more than $14 million in legal costs.87 In 
another case, the parties reported a shared total of $21 million.88 
Regardless of the relative merits of each party’s case, it is 
difficult to predict with certainty which party will ultimately bear 
these costs. Arbitration rules accord arbitrators broad discretion in 
allocating legal costs, and tribunals exercise this discretion 
inconsistently. Both tribunals and commentators agree that the 
practice is “arbitrary and unpredictable.”89 
A.  Application of the American Rule 
In 2007, an empirical study showed that investor-state tribunals 
had followed the American rule and ordered parties to pay their own 
legal fees in about four-fifths of disputes.90 Tribunals have noticed this 
general trend, but they have not yet explained the reasons for it. 
Respected arbitrator and advocate Arthur Rovine wrote simply in his 
dissent to EDF (Services) Ltd. v. Romania91 that “[e]ach side bearing 
its own costs has been an ICSID tradition.”92 Likewise, in his dissent 
to International Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican 
States,93 Professor Thomas Wälde recognized a principle of 
“established NAFTA and ICSID jurisprudence” requiring that “each 
party, winning or losing, bear its own legal expenses and share the 
 
 87. Československá Obchodní Banka A.S. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, 
Award, ¶ 374 (Dec. 29, 2004), 13 ICSID Rep. 181 (2008). 
 88. PSEG Global Inc. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/05, Award, ¶ 353 
(Jan. 19, 2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=showDoc&docId=DC630_En&caseId=C212. 
 89. Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶ 159 
(Oct. 11, 2002), 6 ICSID Rep. 192 (2004); DUGAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 614; see also 
CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, LORETTA MALINTOPPI, AUGUST REINISCH & ANTHONY SINCLAIR, 
THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 1229 (2d ed. 2009) (“The practice of ICSID 
tribunals in apportioning costs is neither clear nor uniform.”); Steven Smith, Benjamin 
Smietana, Grant Gelberg, Ivana Cingel, Kevin Rubino, Spencer Jones, Frederic Sourgens & 
Sean Newell, International Commercial Dispute Resolution, 42 INT’L LAW. 363, 393 (2008) 
(describing the American rule as the “traditional approach” but noting tribunals’ increasing 
tendency to depart from tradition). 
 90. Franck, supra note 56, at 69. 
 91. EDF (Servs.) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/13, Award (Oct. 8, 2009), 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&
docId=DC1215_En&caseId=C57. 
 92. EDF (Servs.) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Dissent Regarding Costs, 
¶ 4 (Oct. 8, 2009), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&
actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1216_En&caseId=C57. 
 93. Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Arbitral Award (NAFTA 
Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Jan. 26, 2006), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ThunderbirdAward.pdf. 
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costs of arbitration,” unless arbitrators find “either gross professional 
misconduct” or “a manifestly spurious claim.”94 
B.  Application of the Pro-Claimant Rule 
In an attempt to explain the 20 percent of cases in which the costs 
do not simply “lie where they fall,” a second line of analysis suggests 
that tribunals do not actually follow the American rule, but rather the 
pro-claimant rule—without ever saying so explicitly. Professor Schill 
makes this argument in a 2006 article.95 Analyzing what tribunals do, 
rather than what they say, Schill asserts that tribunals consistently 
award legal costs to prevailing claimants but not to prevailing 
respondents, resulting in a “one-way, pro-investor cost-shifting 
approach.”96 
Schill acknowledges that a number of cases do not immediately 
appear to support his theory, but he argues that these cases are 
nevertheless more compatible with a pro-claimant rule than it would 
first appear.97 Schill argues that the majority of legal cost awards 
requiring unsuccessful claimants to pay prevailing respondents’ legal 
costs have not resulted solely from the merits of the case, as would 
happen under the English rule. Rather, such awards have been made 
with the intention of punishing claimants’ “frivolous and spurious 
claims or, more generally, bad faith litigation.”98 Put simply, Schill 
proposes that tribunals have actually adopted a de facto pro-claimant 
rule and that other commentators have simply misinterpreted a 
traditional penalty for bad faith—awarding legal costs—as sporadic 
application of the English rule. 
Moreover, Schill argues that the de facto pro-claimant rule is a 
normatively appropriate rule for the investor-state arbitration system, 
and that this rule should be made de jure.99 He envisions the investor-
state arbitration system as “a mechanism for the enforcement of 
 
 94. Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Separate Opinion, at 116 
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Dec. 2005), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ThunderbirdSeparate
Opinion.pdf. 
 95. Schill, supra note 6, at 657. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.; see also id. at 665 (“Apart from [a] single exception, investment tribunals applying 
either ICSID or [United Nations Commission on International Trade Law] arbitration rules 
have not clearly endorsed a ‘loser pays’ approach in order to shift costs in favor of the prevailing 
government unless the claims brought were spurious or otherwise frivolous.”). 
 99. See id. at 674. 
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obligations,”100 which is well suited by a legal-costs rule that 
contributes “additional deterrence of potential defendants” and 
“induces compliance” by incentivizing investors to bring more claims 
for larger amounts.101 Schill’s proinvestor proposal was likely very 
convincing in 2006, one year before Bolivia withdrew from the 
Washington Convention, when the legal regime seemed to be on 
firmer footing.102 Today, however, the backlash against investor-state 
arbitration provides sufficient reason to rethink Schill’s normative 
arguments. Because a uniquely proinvestor procedural advantage 
disincentivizes host states from participating in the investment 
arbitration regime, the overall aim of investment protection would be 
better served by a more balanced approach. After all, investor-state 
arbitration cannot protect any foreign investments if states simply 
withdraw from the system. 
C.  Application of the English Rule 
Even disregarding cases in which legal cost awards may be used 
implicitly as a penalty for bad faith, tribunals do not apply Schill’s 
proposed de facto pro-claimant rule universally. Cases such as EDF 
and Thunderbird provide unmistakable proof that arbitrators follow 
the authentic English rule in some circumstances. In EDF, the 
unsuccessful claimant—who failed to show that the Romanian 
government had taken the claimant’s profitable duty-free business 
and other commercial properties on an arbitrary and discriminatory 
basis—was ordered to indemnify Romania for $6 million of its legal 
costs.103 In Thunderbird, the unsuccessful claimant—who failed to 
show that the Mexican government had closed the claimant’s gaming 
facilities for unfair and inequitable reasons—was ordered to 
indemnify Mexico for $1.1 million.104 In both of these cases, the 
tribunals explicitly found that there had been no bad faith or 
 
 100. Id. at 679. 
 101. Id. at 690–92. 
 102. See Press Release, Int’l Centre for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, supra note 60 (noting 
Bolivia’s “denunciation of the ICSID Convention”). 
 103. EDF (Servs.) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award, ¶ 329 (Oct. 8, 
2009), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=show
Doc&docId=DC1215_En&caseId=C57. 
 104. Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Arbitral Award, ¶ 220 
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Jan. 26, 2006), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ThunderbirdAward
.pdf. 
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misconduct by the claimants during arbitration.105 Nevertheless, both 
tribunals awarded legal costs to the respondents based on the merits 
of the dispute. In doing so, both tribunals observed that it is the 
practice in international commercial arbitration to award costs based 
on the merits of the dispute.106 
There are also a large number of ambiguous cases, such as Link-
Trading Joint Stock Co. v. Department for Customs Control of the 
Republic of Moldova107 and Methanex Corp. v. United States,108 in 
which legal costs are awarded to respondents but there is no explicit 
mention of bad faith. In these cases, however, Schill is convinced by 
the “general tone” of the decisions109 that the claimants’ misconduct 
had a material influence on the result.110 Nevertheless, the tribunals at 
least purported to base their decisions on the respondents’ success on 
the merits.111 Moreover, in numerous cases in which tribunals award 
costs in favor of prevailing claimants, they generally declare in neutral 
terms that “the successful party should receive reimbursement from 
the unsuccessful party.”112 If these tribunals realize that they are 
applying this rule only to the detriment of the states, they do not say 
so explicitly. 
 
 105. See EDF, Award, ¶ 328 (“In the Tribunal’s judgment, the instant dispute was fairly 
brought by Claimant and good faith was evidenced by each side.”); Int’l Thunderbird, Arbitral 
Award, ¶ 218 (“[T]he Parties here presented their case in an efficient and professional 
manner.”). 
 106. See EDF, Award, ¶ 327 (“In the instant case, and generally, the Tribunal’s preferred 
approach to costs is that of international commercial arbitration and its growing application to 
investment arbitration. That is, there should be an allocation of costs that reflects in some 
measure the principle that the losing party pays, but not necessarily all of the costs of the 
arbitration or of the prevailing party.”); Int’l Thunderbird, Arbitral Award, ¶ 214 (noting that 
“the same rules should apply to international investment arbitration as apply in other 
international arbitration proceedings”). 
 107. Link-Trading Joint Stock Co. v. Dep’t for Customs Control of the Republic of Mold., 
Final Award (U.S.-Mold. Apr. 18, 2002), 13 ICSID Rep. 14 (2008). 
 108. Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and 
Merits (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Aug. 3, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 1345 (2005). 
 109. Schill, supra note 6, at 659–60. 
 110. See id. at 659–63 (“[C]ost shifting against the losing investor can be seen as a reaction to 
frivolous claims or bad faith litigation.”). 
 111. Methanex, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, pt. V., ¶ 10; Link-
Trading, Final Award, ¶ 93. 
 112. See, e.g., ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award, ¶ 533 
(Sept. 27, 2006), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ADCvHungaryAward.pdf (“In the present 
case, the Tribunal can find no reason to depart from the starting point that the successful party 
should receive reimbursement from the unsuccessful party.”). 
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In EDF and Thunderbird, when the majorities unambiguously 
applied the English Rule, they provoked vigorous dissents by 
arbitrators Rovine113 and Wälde,114 respectively. Strikingly, both of 
them directed their dissents at the respective majorities’ deliberative 
methodology, rather than at their final decisions to award legal costs. 
Neither dissent defended the American rule or the pro-claimant rule 
on the basis of any particular benefits conferred by either rule. 
Rather, the dissents observed that following the American rule was 
the usual practice in investor-state arbitration and objected to the 
majorities’ “departure”115 from “ICSID tradition”116 and “established 
NAFTA and ICSID jurisprudence”117 without articulating adequate 
reasons for such a departure. Indeed, Rovine acknowledged the 
possibility that there may be “good underlying reasons” for applying 
the English rule but argued forcefully that the majorities should 
either identify and evaluate these hypothetical reasons or else adhere 
to the standard practice.118 
III.  DOCTRINAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR APPLYING THE 
ENGLISH RULE 
This Note follows Rovine and Wälde’s prompting and identifies 
the “good underlying reasons” found in doctrine and public policy 
that support application of the English rule. From a doctrinal 
standpoint, it is not obvious how legal costs should be awarded in 
investor-state arbitration, but there are persuasive reasons for 
applying the English rule. 
Rovine and Wälde’s dissents in EDF and Thunderbird are based 
on a presumption that ICSID tradition should control unless 
adequate reasons can support departure from it. Even in the absence 
 
 113. EDF (Servs.) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Dissent Regarding Costs, 
¶ 4 (Oct. 8, 2009), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&
actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1216_En&caseId=C57. 
 114. Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Separate Opinion, ¶ 124 
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Dec. 2005), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ThunderbirdSeparate
Opinion.pdf. 
 115. Id. ¶ 126; see also EDF, Dissent Regarding Costs, ¶ 6 (“In light of the determinations 
made by the Tribunal . . . there is a question whether there is a sufficient or any reason in this 
case to depart from the approach of each side bearing its own costs.” (emphasis added)). 
 116. EDF, Dissent Regarding Costs, ¶ 4. 
 117. Int’l Thunderbird, Separate Opinion, ¶ 124. 
 118. EDF, Dissent Regarding Costs, ¶ 12 (“There may well be good underlying reasons for 
applying the loser pays doctrine . . . .”). 
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of a formal rule of stare decisis, the existence of settled legal doctrine 
might demonstrate that previous tribunals have already identified, 
evaluated, and reconciled the issues worthy of consideration in 
resolving a specific type of legal problem.119 Economist and 
philosopher F.A. Hayek argued that judicial precedent safeguards 
“the experience gained by the experimentation of generations,” 
which “embodies more knowledge than [is] possessed by anyone.”120 
In Rovine and Wälde’s view, because the EDF and Thunderbird 
majorities did not support their decisions with precedent, the 
decisions were presumptively contrary to established law.121 
Departure from the American rule, therefore, came with the 
methodological burden of providing a rationale for the departure. 
Had the majorities simply followed the American rule, there would 
have been no such burden and no need for additional justifications. 
But it is unfair to give such emphasis to nonbinding precedent, 
because investor-state arbitration recognizes other sources of law and 
gives them equal or greater doctrinal weight. Under Article 42(1) of 
the Washington Convention, tribunals are to apply two sources of law 
when the Convention, the investment treaty, and parties’ choice-of-
law agreements leave a question unsettled. First, arbitrators “shall 
apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute.”122 Second, 
arbitrators shall apply “rules of international law.”123 This second 
source, “rules of international law,” is the window through which 
investor-state arbitral precedents may affect future disputes. As 
Wälde himself observed in Thunderbird, precedent properly applies 
in an investor-state dispute only because it is a traditionally 
recognized subcomponent of public international law.124 
But precedent is not the only component of international law, 
nor is it given the most deference. In fact, both the EDF and 
Thunderbird majorities also based their use of the English rule on an 
equally valid subcomponent of public international law, “general 
 
 119. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW 
TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 47 
(3d ed. 2007) (comparing the use of precedent in civil law and common law systems). 
 120. 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 119 (1973). 
 121. EDF, Dissent Regarding Costs, ¶¶ 6, 10; Int’l Thunderbird, Separate Opinion, ¶¶ 126, 
129. 
 122. Washington Convention, supra note 41, art. 42(1), 17 U.S.T. at 1286, 575 U.N.T.S. at 
186. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Int’l Thunderbird, Separate Opinion, ¶ 129. 
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principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”125 The EDF 
tribunal, for example, announced that “[i]n the instant case, and 
generally, the Tribunal’s preferred approach to costs is that of 
international commercial arbitration and its growing application to 
investment arbitration.”126 Though the majorities did not make this 
doctrinal link explicit, such a statement about international 
commercial arbitration can only be interpreted as a reference to a 
“general principle of law.”127 That is the only basis on which a 
reference to international commercial arbitration, an entirely distinct 
form of dispute settlement, could be meaningful in an investor-state 
arbitration. Indeed, at least one writer on legal costs has concluded 
that commercial arbitral practice is evidence of a “general principle” 
supporting application of the English rule.128 “General principles of 
law recognized by civilized nations” are also a component of public 
international law and are doctrinally granted more weight than 
precedent.129 
Therefore, because the majorities identified a suitable doctrinal 
basis for their decisions—a general principle of law as evidenced by 
international commercial arbitration—Rovine and Wälde were wrong 
to insist that the burden rested squarely with the majorities to identify 
additional reasons supporting application of the English rule. The 
majorities likely could have articulated the link between commercial 
arbitration and investor-state arbitration more clearly, if only to 
insulate their decisions from dissent. Likewise, the majorities could 
have drawn on several other applicable sources of law that would 
have unambiguously supported application of the English rule. An 
examination of these sources follows. 
 
 125. Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Arbitral Award, ¶ 90 
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Jan. 26, 2006), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ThunderbirdAward
.pdf. 
 126. EDF (Servs.) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award, ¶ 327 (Oct. 8, 
2009), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=show
Doc&docId=DC1215_En&caseId=C57. 
 127. See infra Part III.C. 
 128. See John Yukio Gotanda, Awarding Costs and Attorneys’ Fees in International 
Commercial Arbitrations, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 34 & n.160 (1999) (“[T]he principle that costs 
follow the event is almost universally recognized. Indeed, it is so well-accepted that it may be 
viewed as a general principle of international law.” (footnote omitted)). 
 129. See infra Part III.C. 
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A.  Ex Ante Agreements Are Generally Silent as to How Legal Costs 
Should Be Awarded 
As a preliminary matter, it is important to recognize that the 
sources of investment law specified in Article 42(1) of the 
Washington Convention are not all of equal weight. Taking its basic 
structure from commercial arbitration, the investor-state arbitration 
system gives priority to sources of law chosen by the parties to the 
dispute.130 Therefore, tribunals first look to the Washington 
Convention, the investment treaty, and any other choice-of-law rules 
selected ex ante by the parties. It is only in the absence of ex ante 
agreement that tribunals are obliged to consider the two gap-fillers—
that is, “the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute . . . and 
such rules of international law as may be applicable.”131 
Unfortunately, ex ante agreements rarely provide guidance on 
the distribution of legal costs. The Washington Convention, which 
governs the procedure of ICSID-appointed tribunals, gives arbitrators 
complete discretion under Article 61(2) to determine how legal costs 
should be awarded: “[T]he Tribunal shall, except as the parties 
otherwise agree . . . decide how and by whom those expenses . . . shall 
be paid.”132 Other sets of commonly selected procedural rules grant 
equally broad discretion. For example, though the rules authored by 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) hint at a presumption that arbitrators should apply the 
English rule to a portion of the costs, arbitrators may apparently 
reject this presumption for whatever reasons they wish.133 
 
 130. See ALAN REDFERN, MARTIN HUNTER, NIGEL BLACKABY & CONSTANTINE 
PARTASIDES, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 94 (4th 
ed. 2004) (“It is generally recognized that parties to an international commercial agreement are 
free to choose for themselves the law (or the legal rules) applicable to that agreement.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 131. Washington Convention, supra note 41, art. 42(1), 17 U.S.T. at 1286, 575 U.N.T.S. at 
186. 
 132. Id. art. 61(2), 17 U.S.T. at 1294, 575 U.N.T.S at 198. 
 133. Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 43d Sess., June 
21–July 9, 2010, annex I, art. 42, U.N. Doc. A/65/17; GAOR, 65th Sess., Supp. No. 17 (2010), 
available at uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-
e.pdf. Article 42(2) of the UNCITRAL Rules gives tribunals complete discretion with respect to 
attorneys’ fees, id. annex I, art. 42(2), although Article 42(1) provides that “[t]he costs of the 
arbitration”—meaning administrative costs and arbitrators’ fees—“shall in principle be borne 
by the unsuccessful party,” id. annex I, art. 42(1). 
  The current Article 42 was originally Article 40 when the UNCITRAL rules were first 
adopted, Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 
G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976), but was renumbered when the rules 
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Likewise, investment treaties and choice-of-law agreements are 
almost invariably silent on legal costs, leaving arbitrators with an 
“unfettered and arbitrary” discretion that makes both tribunals and 
commentators acutely uncomfortable.134 Professor Schill has pointed 
out the irony of this broad discretion, given that any discretionary 
exercise of power without a reasoned basis seems somewhat contrary 
to the spirit of international investment law.135 After all, investment 
law does not permit states to treat foreign investors in an arbitrary 
manner. Rather, investor-state tribunals require judicial and 
administrative organs of state governments to base all of their 
decisionmaking on adequate and articulated reasoning,136 and they 
unanimously agree that arbitrary treatment constitutes a breach of 
investment treaties’ substantive protections.137 Admitting that their 
own decisionmaking with regard to legal costs is arbitrary or 
unfettered would place an investor-state tribunal in a position of 
hypocrisy. 
To dispel the discomfort surrounding their “unfettered and 
arbitrary” discretion as to legal costs, tribunals frequently go beyond 
the ex ante texts in search of legal principles on which to base their 
decisions. This search draws tribunals to examine the law of the 
domestic jurisdiction and public international law. Indeed, tribunals 
 
were amended, Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Committee on International Trade 
Law as Revised in 2010, G.A. Draft Res., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/65/L.5 (Oct. 26, 2010). 
 134. See Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Separate Opinion, ¶ 125 
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Dec. 2005), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ThunderbirdSeparate
Opinion.pdf (analyzing the tribunal’s discretion under the UNCITRAL rules); Schill, supra note 
6, at 658–59 (“The discretion conferred upon arbitral tribunals accounts for a considerable 
amount of uncertainty in the allocation of costs in investment treaty arbitration.”). 
 135. See Schill, supra note 6, at 664–65 (“[T]he assumption of an unfettered discretion that 
would allow tribunals to decide the issue of costs without regard to prior practice in investment 
treaty arbitration comes close to arbitrary and inconsistent decision-making of administrative 
agencies, a practice that can constitute a violation of fair and equitable treatment under 
international investment treaties if entertained by domestic administrators.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 136. See, e.g., Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v. United Mexican States, ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 154 (May 29, 2003), 10 ICSID Rep. 134 (2004) (emphasizing 
the need for consistency in the decisionmaking of a national agency under the guarantee of fair 
and equitable treatment). 
 137. See, e.g., Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States of America, Award, ¶¶ 625–626 (NAFTA 
Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. June 8, 2009), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Glamis_Award_001.pdf 
(“Previous tribunals have indeed found a certain level of arbitrariness to violate the obligations 
of a State under the fair and equitable treatment standard. Indeed, arbitrariness that 
contravenes the rule of law, rather than a rule of law, would occasion surprise not only from 
investors, but also from tribunals.”). 
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may even be obligated to do so. After all, if tribunals’ discretion on 
legal costs were actually unfettered, then Rovine and Wälde would 
have had no basis for their objections in EDF and Thunderbird. 
Despite the confidence with which the dissenters defended the 
doctrinal correctness of the American rule, an examination of the 
additional sources of applicable law—domestic law and public 
international law—reveals substantial authority favoring application 
of the English rule. 
B.  Domestic Law Supports the English Rule in All Disputes in which 
the United States Is Not a Party 
In nearly every investor-state dispute, application of “the law of 
the Contracting State party” supports application of the English rule. 
The term “English rule” is a misnomer made in America. Nearly 
every domestic legal system in the world, whether belonging to the 
common law138 or civil law tradition,139 follows a variation of the rule 
that “costs follow the event.” The single obvious exception is the 
United States, which follows the American rule.140 
Some jurisdictions codify the English rule in statutes or 
regulations.141 In others, the English rule is a judge-made practice.142 
Some jurisdictions follow the Welamson doctrine, which awards legal 
costs to the prevailing party based on the proportion of its successful 
claims to its unsuccessful claims.143 Despite these variations, in the 
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions worldwide, courts award 
reasonable legal costs to the prevailing party. Though several 
 
 138. See 1 LORD JUSTICE JACKSON, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: PRELIMINARY 
REPORT 21–22 (analyzing the rules on costs in the United Kingdom); 2 id. at 545–639 (2009) 
(analyzing the rules on costs of other major common law jurisdictions in the world, including 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Scotland, and observing that only the United States 
follows the American rule). 
 139. See MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 84, at 1026–27 (observing that all civil law 
jurisdictions follow some version of the English rule, though five civil law jurisdictions only 
apply the English Rule to the costs that the court or administrative tribunal incurs, rather than 
to both the tribunal’s costs and the parties’ attorneys’ costs). 
 140. See, e.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717–18 
(1967) (considering the policies underpinning the American rule); Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 
(3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (recognizing the American rule to be “[t]he general practice of the 
United States”). 
 141. See Gotanda, supra note 128, at 6–7 (citing the legislation of France, Germany, Sweden, 
and Brazil). 
 142. See id. (citing judge-made law in Canada and Australia). 
 143. J. Gillis Wetter & Charl Priem, Costs and Their Allocation in International Commercial 
Arbitrations, 2 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 249, 273–74 (1991). 
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theoretical justifications for this practice exist,144 domestic courts most 
widely adhere to the rationale that a claimant should be made 
financially whole for a legal wrong suffered and should not be 
satisfied with a lesser amount because of the necessity of suing.145 
Likewise, one who successfully defends himself against an unjustified 
claim should come out of the experience without financial loss.146 
In at least three cases before investor-state tribunals, arbitrators 
have looked to a host state’s law either to support a decision on legal 
costs147 or to dissent from one.148 This demonstrates that Article 42(1) 
of the Washington Convention is not a dead letter rendered irrelevant 
by arbitrators’ preference for case law. Therefore, because the United 
States is the sole jurisdiction that does not follow the English rule, the 
law of “the Contracting State party” should consistently support 
applying the English rule whenever the respondent is not the United 
States. 
C.  The English Rule in Public International Law 
Though arbitrators have looked to domestic law in certain 
decisions about legal costs, they have referred to public international 
law in many more. Indeed, as Wälde recognized in Thunderbird, 
 
 144. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical 
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 653 (citing six theoretical grounds for the practice). 
 145. Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 65–67 (Winter 1984) (citing Italian, German, and French authorities). 
 146. Id. at 66–67. 
 147. See CME Czech Republic B.V. (Neth.) v. Czech Republic, Final Award on Damages, 
¶¶ 648–649 (UNCITRAL Arb. Mar. 14, 2003), 9 ICSID Rep. 264 (2006) (referring to Czech 
law); see also Himpurna California Energy Ltd. (Berm.) v. PT. (Persero) Perusahaan Listruik 
Negara (Indon.), Final Award, ¶ 390 (UNCITRAL Arb. May 4, 1999), reprinted in 25 Y.B. 
COMM. ARB. 13 (2000) (referring to Indonesian law, the host state’s law, and to U.S. law, the 
law of the investor’s home state). In Himpurna, the tribunal decided not to award costs in part 
because it found that litigants in both the United States and Indonesia “broadly” bear their 
attorneys’ fees, even though Indonesia does in fact require unsuccessful parties to pay the costs 
that the court or administrative tribunal incurs. MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 84, at 1026–27. 
 148. Professor Wälde’s separate opinion in Thunderbird conducted a comparative analysis 
of domestic law across the continent, looking broadly to “practice in North American litigation 
and arbitration.” See Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Separate 
Opinion, ¶ 124 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Dec. 2005), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
ThunderbirdSeparateOpinion.pdf (“[I]n North American litigation and arbitration . . . . ‘[f]ee 
shifting’ is as a rule only allowed in case of misconduct—contempt of court, incompetent or 
unacceptable litigation conduct, bad faith in arbitration or frivolous claims.” (footnotes 
omitted)). Professor Wälde’s findings do not seem easily reconcilable with Lord Justice 
Jackson’s descriptions of Canadian practice, see 2 JACKSON, supra note 138, at 85, or with 
Professor Gotanda’s descriptions of Mexican practice, see Gotanda, supra note 128, at 8. 
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public international law is the only channel through which precedent 
may enter a tribunal’s deliberative process under Article 42(1).149 
The content of public international law is not defined in the 
Washington Convention, but it is well understood to consist of the 
five components described in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice.150 A two-tiered hierarchy exists within 
these five components. The three sources of public international law 
include “international conventions,” “international custom,” and 
“general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”151 The two 
subsidiary means of determining international law include “judicial 
decisions,” such as the awards rendered by investor-state tribunals, 
and “the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists,” a phrase 
which refers generally to academic commentary on international 
law.152 Doctrinally, when precedent or academic commentary is in 
conflict with any of the primary sources of international law, courts 
and tribunals should follow the primary sources. In public 
international law, precedent and academic commentary “do not 
create rules of law, but only serve as means for determining such 
rules.”153 
Considering the almost universal acceptance of the English rule 
on legal costs in domestic law, Dean Gotanda has proposed that the 
rule “constitutes a general principle of international law” recognized 
by civilized nations.154 General principles of law may be identified 
when the national laws of many domestic systems converge, though 
unanimous worldwide convergence is not required.155 In particular, 
these principles frequently help international courts settle questions 
of procedure.156 
 
 149. Int’l Thunderbird, Separate Opinion, ¶ 129. 
 150. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 
1060. 
 151. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4–5 (1998) (quoting 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 150, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. at 1060). 
 152. Id. at 19, 24. 
 153. BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
AND TRIBUNALS 23 (2006). 
 154. Gotanda, supra note 128, 34 n.160. But see Gotanda, supra note 6, at 17 (citing the 
policy rationale of predictability, rather than doctrine, as the basis for adopting the American 
rule on legal costs). 
 155. Emmanuel Gaillard, Use of General Principles of International Law in International 
Long-Term Contracts, 27 INT’L BUS. LAW. 214, 216 (1999). 
 156. IAN BROWNLIE, THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 23 (1998). 
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Not all commentators and tribunals agree, however, that 
comparative domestic practice is the only factor in identifying a 
general principle of law. Some writers insist that examination of 
comparative international practice is also a necessary step.157 Sharing 
this view, the Thunderbird and EDF tribunals based part of their 
respective decisions on a review of the treatment of legal costs in 
various forms of international litigation. Both majorities looked to 
international commercial arbitration, which in a sense is an 
international practice, though it governs private legal relationships 
rather than public ones.158 The EDF tribunal also considered what it 
ambiguously called “the public international rule,” which, from the 
context, most likely referred to cases before the ICJ.159 Professor 
Wälde’s dissent in Thunderbird broadly surveyed the practices of the 
WTO dispute-settlement body, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR), and the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.160 
As a whole, international litigation presents a more divided and 
complicated picture than does domestic law. Although permitted 
under its statute to award legal costs to litigating states at its 
discretion,161 the ICJ has always followed the American rule—which is 
unsurprising given the ICJ’s difficulties with enforcing awards of 
ordinary monetary damages.162 The WTO dispute-settlement body 
likewise follows the American rule—which is even less surprising 
because the WTO’s remedies are entirely nonmonetary.163 By 
contrast, the ECHR and its analogue, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (IACHR), both follow the pro-claimant rule to 
 
 157. CHENG, supra note 153, at 2–3. 
 158. EDF (Servs.) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award, ¶ 326 (Oct. 8, 
2009), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=show
Doc&docId=DC1215_En&caseId=C57; Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican 
States, Arbitral Award, ¶ 218 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Jan. 26, 2006), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/
documents/ThunderbirdAward.pdf. 
 159. EDF, Award, ¶ 322. 
 160. See Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Separate Opinion, ¶¶ 
140–141 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Jan. 26, 2006), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Thunderbird
SeparateOpinion.pdf (observing that in the WTO and under the European Convention on 
Human Rights, prevailing parties are not awarded costs, whereas in the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal, costs have been awarded in only a fraction of the cases). 
 161. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 150, art. 64, 59 Stat. at 1063 
(“Unless otherwise decided by the Court, each party shall bear its own costs.”). 
 162. BROWN, supra note 53, at 193–94. 
 163. Id. at 216. 
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accommodate claimants who may be “indigent, social outcasts, or 
marginalized.”164 
Nevertheless, international legal practice sometimes follows the 
English rule. International commercial arbitration, in particular, 
follows the English rule, as the Thunderbird and EDF tribunals 
observed.165 So does the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal in most of its 
cases.166 Therefore, though far from unanimous, international legal 
practice still provides an adequate doctrinal basis for the application 
of the English rule on legal costs. 
*          *          * 
From a doctrinal standpoint, it is not obvious how legal costs 
should be awarded in investor-state arbitration, but there is at least as 
much support for the English rule as for either alternative. Though 
ICSID case law tends to support either the pro-claimant rule or the 
American rule, tribunals have applied or purported to apply the 
English rule in many cases. Domestic law almost always supports the 
English rule, except when the United States is a party to the dispute. 
Domestic litigation provides evidence that the English rule is a 
general principle of law, but the practice in international litigation is 
more mixed. 
Therefore, because doctrine does not settle the question entirely, 
tribunals are justified in moving past doctrine to consider public 
policy and practical realities. 
IV.  POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR APPLYING THE ENGLISH RULE 
Though the legal doctrine presents a somewhat divided picture, 
public policy considerations support application of the English rule. 
This is particularly true in the post-2007 political environment. Today, 
the investor-state arbitration system is regularly accused of both 
 
 164. DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 368 (2d ed. 
2005). But see id. (noting, however, that the IACHR had followed the American rule until 
1998). 
 165. See Gotanda, supra note 128, at 34 n.160 (explaining that most countries award costs 
and attorneys’ fees, which suggests that the practice is a “general principle of international 
law”). 
 166. STEPHEN J. TOOPE, MIXED INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 380 (1990) (noting that the 
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, in Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. v. Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 298 (1985), observed that the tribunal could award 
costs only if they were reasonable). 
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showing a proinvestor bias and of producing a chilling effect on host 
states’ legitimate use of police power.167 The pro-claimant rule and the 
American rule only exacerbate these harmful effects by virtue of the 
financial incentives they provide to claimants and respondents. By 
comparison, the financial incentives the English rule creates are fairer 
and more sensible. 
This Part first describes the various financial incentives each rule 
creates. Then it notes the connections between the pro-claimant rule 
and the alleged “pro-investor bias,” with reference to Schill’s 
argument that this bias is a positive feature of the investor-state 
arbitration system.168 Finally, this Part analyzes the connection 
between application of the American rule and the regulatory chill 
that critics of the system have observed, and explains why the 
American rule encourages high-value, low-merit nuisance suits 
against host states. 
A.  The Financial Incentives That Each Rule Creates 
Each rule on legal costs produces a unique set of incentives for 
prospective parties. The English rule encourages claimants to bring 
stronger, smaller claims.169 By contrast, the American rule encourages 
claimants to bring weaker, larger claims.170 The pro-claimant rule 
encourages the bringing of all claims, no matter how small or weak.171 
Under the American rule, because even a successful claimant is 
required to bear its own costs, the rational claimant is discouraged 
from bringing a claim for an amount less than the cost of litigating, 
 
 167. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text. 
 168. Schill, supra note 6, at 657. 
 169. In this discussion, the strength or weakness of a claim is defined as the probability of its 
success at trial. A claim may be made weak or strong by virtue of its factual or legal basis. The 
size of a claim, by contrast, refers to the monetary amount sought by the claimant in damages. 
See, e.g., Avery Katz, Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?, 
3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 143, 156 (1987) (“[A] plaintiff with a low estimate of her chances will give 
a relatively high weight to the prospect of indemnifying her opponent and will be less inclined to 
sue. For analogous reasons, however, the English rule encourages plaintiffs with relatively low 
ratios of total stakes to total cost and relatively high probabilities of victory.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 170. See, e.g., Prichard, supra note 5, at 460–61 (noting that the American cost rules allowing 
group and class action litigation, expanding the scope of litigation, and providing minimal fee 
shifting do not create institutional barriers to litigating novel legal theories). 
 171. See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 5, at 445 (“The incentive to bring suit is greater under the 
Pro-plaintiff rule than under either the American or British rule.”). 
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even if the probability of recovering on the claim is 100 percent.172 On 
the other hand, the rational claimant is encouraged to bring a claim if 
the amount of the claim discounted by the probability of losing is 
greater than the claimant’s own legal costs, even if the probability of 
losing is very high.173 Therefore, a claimant under the American rule is 
encouraged to bring a weak, large claim but discouraged from 
bringing a strong, small claim. 
By contrast, under the English rule, the rational claimant is 
encouraged to bring a small claim, provided the claim is strong 
enough that the claimant is satisfied with its probability of winning, 
because a prevailing claimant will not bear its own legal costs.174 On 
the other hand, the rational claimant is discouraged from bringing a 
low-probability claim, even if the amount of the claim is very great, 
because a failed claim comes with the additional burden of bearing 
the respondent’s legal costs.175 
Finally, the pro-claimant rule creates a financial incentive for the 
bringing of any claim, no matter how small or how weak, without any 
corresponding disincentives. No matter how small the claim may be, 
success on the merits will protect the claimant from losing any of its 
recovered damages to legal costs. No matter how weak the claim, no 
possible result will require the claimant to pay the respondent’s legal 
costs.176 Unlike the English rule or the American rule, the pro-
claimant rule tilts the playing field plainly in favor of one party, as its 
name indicates. 
 
 172. See Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative 
Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 58 (1982) (“[U]nder the 
American system, the plaintiff will bring suit if and only if his expected judgment would be at 
least as large as his legal costs.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 173. See id. at 58–59 (explaining that, assuming the claimant is risk neutral and no fee 
shifting is involved, under the American rule a claimant calculates whether to bring an action 
simply by discounting the probability of winning by the expected legal costs). 
 174. See id. at 59 (“[I]t is apparent that the frequency of suit will be greater under the British 
system when the plaintiff believes the likelihood of prevailing is sufficiently high . . . . because 
when the plaintiff is relatively optimistic about prevailing . . . he will be thinking about the 
possibility of not having to pay any . . . costs . . . .”). 
 175. See id. at 59–60 (explaining that suits with a low probability of success in the British 
system are, on average, more costly than in the American system because an unsuccessful 
claimant is responsible for opposing legal costs). 
 176. See id. at 60 (noting that the only factors a claimant considers in a pro-claimant system 
are the expected legal costs and the probability of success). 
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B.  The Pro-Claimant Rule and Proinvestor Bias 
Tilting the playing field is exactly what motivates jurisdictions to 
deploy the pro-claimant rule. That is, when a jurisdiction perceives a 
preexisting power imbalance between certain classes of potential 
claimants and respondents, the jurisdiction may adopt the pro-
claimant rule for certain types of litigation to correct this imbalance.177 
For example, because employers almost always have greater access to 
financial resources than do their employees, numerous American 
statutes allow employees to recover attorneys’ fees if they prevail in 
suits against their employers.178 Likewise, the ECHR follows the pro-
claimant rule because the victims of human rights abuses are “often 
indigent, social outcasts, or marginalized.”179 
In his 2006 article endorsing the pro-claimant rule, Schill argues 
that the investor-state context is analogous.180 According to Schill, the 
“equality paradigm” followed in ordinary litigation and commercial 
arbitration should be discarded in disputes between states and 
investors because the states and investors are in a “hierarchical 
relationship,” rather than on equal footing.181 States may “unilaterally 
impose binding obligations on a foreign investor in the form of 
administrative orders or legislation.”182 Further, “under general 
international law, a State is even entitled . . . to change the national 
law that governs investor-State contracts.”183 
But Schill is wrong to imply that the state is therefore always in a 
position of power over the investor during dispute settlement. 
Though Schill correctly points out that the investor-state relationship 
is not like a commercial relationship, none of the sovereign powers 
Schill identifies has any effect on the outcome of arbitration. It is 
unclear why sovereign powers necessarily create a dispute-settlement 
environment that does not fit an equality paradigm, especially when 
 
 177. Rowe, supra note 144, at 663–65. 
 178. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) (“The 
court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, 
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 179. SHELTON, supra note 164, at 368 (“Attorneys who bring human rights cases need to be 
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 180. Schill, supra note 6, at 679. 
 181. Id. 
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 183. Id. 
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abusing sovereign powers is how states incur liability. The only 
sovereign power that would be useful in this context, immunity from 
suit, is already waived by accession to an investment treaty. None of 
the host state’s other sovereign powers can assist it during investor-
state arbitration. 
Actual power imbalances during investor-state arbitration are 
more likely to arise from another source of power, unrelated to 
national sovereignty: financial resources. The party with greater 
financial resources can hire superior legal representation, conduct 
factual research in greater depth, and present its case in a more 
effective fashion.184 Though in some cases the host state may have 
greater access to financial resources than does the claimant,185 this is 
not always the case. The vast majority of claimants are transnational 
corporations with substantial budgets.186 A 2007 study found that 20 
percent of investor-state arbitration was initiated by corporations that 
ranked in Fortune’s Global 500.187 In fact, in seven of those cases, the 
claimant’s corporate revenues exceeded the GDP of the defending 
country.188 
The most notorious example of a claimant outspending and out-
lawyering a respondent is the case of CDC Group PLC v. Republic of 
the Seychelles.189 The Republic of Seychelles, an island country of 
approximately eighty thousand people, “many of them illiterate,”190 
was represented solely by its attorney general, whose office had an 
unreliable Internet connection, no access to Westlaw or Lexis, and 
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only two outdated English treatises on contract law.191 The claimant, 
the Commonwealth Development Corporation, though technically 
“an investor” covered under the treaty, was not purely a private 
party, but an instrumentality of the British government.192 
Represented by a major international law firm based in London with 
a specialty practice in investor-state arbitration,193 the claimant routed 
the respondent and recovered a total of $4.6 million.194 
Following a de facto pro-claimant rule in such lopsided contexts 
only provides fuel for critics and uncooperative governments, who 
already protest that “the rules are rigged” in favor of investors.195 A 
system in which an arm of the British government can mobilize the 
Magic Circle to retrieve millions of dollars from a tiny island republic 
can hardly be characterized as structurally imbalanced in favor of the 
respondent. Such a system is not at all like employment litigation in 
the United States or human rights disputes before the ECHR, in 
which the claimants are frequently at a financial disadvantage. Thus, 
the investor-state arbitration system seems like a bad candidate for 
the pro-claimant rule. 
C.  The American Rule and Regulatory Chill 
The investor-state arbitration system is also a bad candidate for 
the American rule because of its particular vulnerability to nuisance 
suits. “Nuisance suits” are suits that may have little chance of success 
but that would still be cheaper for respondents to settle than to 
litigate.196 Economists have shown that a respondent is most likely to 
settle a nuisance suit under the American rule and least likely to 
settle a nuisance suit under the English rule.197 In the investor-state 
context, nuisance suits could force a host state to spend part of its 
budget to needlessly settle low-merit claims, rather than to promote 
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the health, welfare, and safety of its citizens.198 They might also force a 
state’s government to refrain from legitimate uses of its police power 
that could give a potential claimant an opportunity to bring a 
nuisance suit.199 To limit this avenue for “legalized blackmail” of host 
states,200 investor-state tribunals should apply the English rule on legal 
costs, rather than the American rule. 
Theoretically, the investor-state arbitration system is already 
particularly vulnerable to nuisance suits, regardless of which legal cost 
award rule it applies. Economists have demonstrated that 
respondents are most vulnerable to nuisance suits when they are 
uncertain as to whether a claim is credible201 or when the cost of 
responding to a claim is higher than the cost of settling.202 
Unfortunately, uncertainty and expense are two hallmarks of 
investor-state arbitration.203 Though using awards of legal costs as a 
penalty for frivolous claims and bad faith is likely to lessen the threat 
of nuisance suits, this will not be a sufficient deterrent in all instances. 
A respondent must spend a great deal of money determining for itself 
whether the claim is frivolous before it can even begin to prove as 
much to the tribunal. Unlike sanctions for bad-faith litigation in some 
domestic systems,204 with which judges may punish misconduct at any 
time after the filing of a claim, investor-state tribunals cannot award 
costs to either party except as “part of the award”—that is, after the 
tribunal makes a final decision on all the issues of the dispute.205 
Effectively, unless a respondent is certain that a claim is 
frivolous, it must be careful at the outset to research, analyze, and 
argue all potential legal and factual issues or lose its opportunity to 
address those issues during arbitration. Consequently, before the 
tribunal ever has the opportunity to punish a claimant for bringing a 
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nuisance claim, the respondent must first pay counsel to guide it 
through at least the following phases: constitution of the arbitral 
panel,206 assessment of the arbitrators’ conflicts and disqualification 
proceedings,207 memorials and hearings on provisional measures,208 
memorials and hearings on jurisdiction and admissibility,209 memorials 
and hearings on ancillary claims,210 production and review of 
documents,211 and memorials and hearings on core issues.212 During 
this lengthy process, the respondent spends on average between one 
and two million dollars per year, and potentially far more.213 
Because investor-state arbitration is already particularly 
vulnerable to nuisance suits, the American rule serves this regime 
very poorly. The American rule exacerbates the threat of nuisance 
suits and encourages settlement even when a claim is frivolous or, at 
least, unlikely to succeed. Continued application of the American rule 
only confirms the perception that investor-state arbitration is a 
mechanism for the legalized blackmail of host states, impeding the 
ability of governments to protect the health, safety, and human rights 
of their citizens.214 To correct this, investor-state tribunals should 
abandon the American rule and apply the English rule instead. 
CONCLUSION 
In the last several years, investor-state tribunals and 
commentators have cautioned with increasing frequency that “a 
balanced approach” is the best way of interpreting an investment 
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treaty’s substantive protections, and that tribunals should “temper” 
their “pro-investor inclination.”215 This is because “an interpretation 
which exaggerates the protection to be accorded to foreign 
investments may serve to dissuade host States from admitting foreign 
investments and so undermine the overall aim” of the investor-state 
arbitration system.216 Though these cautionary statements refer 
generally to the textual interpretation of investment treaties’ 
substantive protections, rather than to the exercise of discretion 
under Article 61(2) of the Washington Convention with regard to 
legal costs, these statements share a common spirit with the 
arguments advanced in this Note. Professor Schill was able to argue 
viably in 2006 that conferring a special advantage on claimants was 
appropriate, given that the object and purpose of investment treaties 
seemed primarily to be protection of these claimants.217 Today, 
however, Schill’s argument seems dangerous. After all, the investor-
state arbitration system will be unable to protect anyone unless it can 
first ensure states’ willingness to participate in it. The growing array 
of proposed quasi-legislative solutions might help to save the system, 
but only if they can be politically implemented.218 
In the meantime, the best safeguard of the system is the wisdom 
of the tribunals themselves. When text is silent, as text typically is 
with respect to legal costs in investor-state arbitration, tribunals’ 
principled application of law relies on their consideration of two 
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essential factors—first doctrine, then policy. Because the English rule 
on legal costs is supported by doctrine and would serve essential 
policy goals, the English rule is a promising instrument for fine-tuning 
the investor-state arbitration system. Doctrinally, the English rule on 
legal costs is available because ex ante agreements do not forbid it, 
the respondent’s domestic law almost invariably requires it, and its 
near universality in domestic litigation and commercial arbitration 
may give rise to a general principle of law under public international 
law. 
From a public policy perspective, the English rule possesses two 
advantages over the alternatives. First, the pro-claimant rule is openly 
and deliberately biased against states, which is bound to discourage 
states’ participation in dispute settlement. Second, the American rule 
creates financial incentives that promote low-merit, high-value claims, 
including nuisance suits that deter host states from legitimately using 
their police power. By contrast, application of the English rule on 
legal costs reduces these economic and political burdens on host 
states and helps to ensure their continued participation in investor-
state arbitration. This, in turn, protects and promotes foreign 
investment. Therefore, by applying the English rule on legal costs in 
investor-state arbitration, tribunals can reach the wisest and most 
reasonable results. 
